The Causa Sui and the Ontological Argument, or the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Is-Ought Distinction (2024)

Kant’s Critique of Spinoza

Omri Boehm

Published:

2014

Online ISBN:

9780199354825

Print ISBN:

9780199354801

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Kant’s Critique of Spinoza

Omri Boehm

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Omri Boehm

Omri Boehm

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Pages

150–189

  • Published:

    May 2014

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Boehm, Omri, 'The Causa Sui and the Ontological Argument, or the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Is-Ought Distinction', Kant’s Critique of Spinoza (New York, 2014; online edn, Oxford Academic, 22 May 2014), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199354801.003.0005, accessed 25 June 2024.

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Abstract

Spinoza’s causa sui poses a challenge to Kant’s attack on rational cosmology, and thereby to his attack on metaphysical rationalism as a whole. The chapter suggests the Kantian response, namely that the causa sui fails with the refutation of the ontological argument. It is argued, more generally, that the Principle of Sufficient Reason fails if existence is not a first order predicate. One problem with this answer is that Kant’s refutation of the ontological argument begs the question vis-à-vis Spinozist necessitarianism. This in turn challenges Kant’s refutation of dogmatic metaphysics as a whole. The chapter concludes developing a Kantian defense of the refutation of the ontological argument. This strategy suggests a link between the non-necessitarian assumptions of Kant’s refutation of the ontological argument (dissociating existence from thought) and his insistence on the is-ought distinction.

Keywords: causa sui, ontological argument, is-ought, first order predicate, Principle of Sufficient Reason, necessitarianism, rationalism

Subject

17th - 18th Century Philosophy History of Western Philosophy Moral Philosophy

Collection: Oxford Scholarship Online

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FAQs

What is causa sui according to Spinoza? ›

Spinoza certainly thinks along those lines when defining the causa sui as that “whose essence involves existence” (E Id1) and when claiming that what cannot be conceived through another must be “conceived through itself” (E Ia2).

What is the principle of sufficient reason Spinoza? ›

The Principle of Sufficient Reason in Spinoza

E1a1 states, “Whatever is, is in itself or in another.” Because inherence entails causation, this entails that whatever is, is either self-caused or caused by another. This also means that whatever is, is understood through itself or understood through another.

What is wrong with the ontological argument? ›

Accordingly, what goes wrong with the first version of the ontological argument is that the notion of existence is being treated as the wrong logical type. Concepts, as a logical matter, are defined entirely in terms of logical predicates.

What do you understand by Spinoza's statement that what is cannot be other than what it is? ›

Things could not have been produced in any order or in any manner other than that which has in fact obtained. In other words, there is only one possible history for the universe or, more to the point, things could not be other than they are. This view is known as necessitarianism.

What is the meaning of causa sui? ›

Causa sui (pronounced [ˈkau̯. sa ˈsʊ. iː]; transl. cause of itself, self-caused) is a Latin term that denotes something that is generated within itself.

What is the proof of God Spinoza? ›

Spinoza rests his proof that God is the only possible substance on the proposition that one substance cannot be produced by another substance,{59} which is a virtual assertion of pantheism.

What is the principle of sufficient reason ontological argument? ›

The principle of sufficient reason states that everything must have a reason or a cause. The principle was articulated and made prominent by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, with many antecedents, and was further used and developed by Arthur Schopenhauer and Sir William Hamilton, 9th Baronet.

What is a simple example of principle of sufficient reason? ›

Thus, for example, I can be sitting, lying down, or standing: all these states are equally possible. Yet if I am standing, there must be a sufficient reason for me to be standing, rather than sitting or lying down.

What is the principle of sufficient reason and God? ›

The actual existence of the latter is explained by the principle of sufficient reason, which asserts that there is an adequate reason to account for the existence and nature of everything that could conceivably not exist. In each such case, the ultimate sufficient reason is the free choice of God.

What is the main idea of the ontological argument? ›

The ontological argument asserts God, being defined as most great or perfect, must exist since a God who exists is greater than a God who does not. It is first mentioned in Anselm's work, the Proslogion. Anselm argued that reality is always better than idea.

What is the ontological argument trying to prove? ›

As an “a priori” argument, the Ontological Argument tries to “prove” the existence of God by establishing the necessity of God's existence through an explanation of the concept of existence or necessary being . Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury first set forth the Ontological Argument in the eleventh century.

What is the strongest argument for God's existence? ›

One type of cosmological, or "first cause" argument, typically called the Kalam cosmological argument, asserts that since everything that begins to exist has a cause, and the universe began to exist, the universe must have had a cause which was itself not caused. This ultimate first cause is identified with God.

What did Spinoza really say about God? ›

Furthermore, Spinoza believes that God is not free in the ordinary sense of the word, but rather an uncompelled being who cannot defy his/her set nature. That is, to Spinoza, God cannot defy who he/she is since it is not in his/her ability to do so.

What does Spinoza mean by reason? ›

The second kind of knowledge, reason, refers to the ability to “perceive many things and form universal notions…from the fact that we have common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things” (EIIp40s2). The common notions are spelled out in the propositions running up to this definition of reason.

What is Spinoza's argument for pantheism? ›

For Spinoza the claim that God is the same as the cosmos is spelled out as the thesis that there exists one and only one particular substance which he refers to as 'God or nature'; the individual thing referred to as 'God' is one and the same object as the complex unit referred to as 'nature' or 'the cosmos.

What does ens causa sui mean? ›

Or "being one's own cause". Traditionally, a being that owes its existence to no other being, hence God or a Supreme Being (cf.

What is God's causa sui? ›

(Latin, cause of itself) The (problematic) property possessed only by God, of being his own cause, i.e. independent of any other ground, yet containing within himself a sufficient explanation of his own being. See also cosmological argument, ontological argument, perseity.

What is the causation of Spinoza? ›

Causal relations between different finite modes, then, always involve the natures of both the affecting and affected modes. action follows from its nature working alongside the natures of whatever other modes are affecting it and that a mode is active when its behavior follows from its nature alone.

What does Nietzsche mean by causa sui? ›

First, Nietzsche attacks the idea of free will. Nietzsche writes: The causa sui [cause of itself] is the best self-contradiction that has ever been conceived, a type of logical rape and abomination.

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